In a recent opinion, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the Kansas statute prohibiting human trafficking. In State v. Williams, Williams challenged the Kansas aggravated trafficking statute as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. No 102,036, slip op. at 4 (Kan. 2011). At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Williams approached L.M., a sixteen-year old girl, in Wichita, Kansas, and asked her to travel to Texas to become a prostitute. After arriving in Texas, Williams told her what to charge for sexual acts and sent her out 10-12 hours a day. A detective noticed L.M. walking along a highway and requested her name. The detective discovered L.M. had been reported as a runaway out of Wichita and took her to police headquarters for an interview. L.M. spoke to law enforcement about how she had gotten to Dallas and what had occurred in Dallas. Williams was tried and convicted of aggravated trafficking.
On appeal, the Supreme Court begins it analysis by examining the language of the statute prohibiting trafficking. Aggravated trafficking is defined as the following: “recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing or obtaining, by any means, a person under 18 years of age knowing that the person, with or without force, fraud, threat or coercion, will be used to engage in forced labor, involuntary servitude or sexual gratification of the defendant or another.” K.S.A. 21-3447(a)(2). Williams argues the definition is overbroad because it effectively prohibits a person from simply requesting a date with a minor or “transporting a minor to prom or to a location where minors will play the game of spin the bottle.” Id. at 8. He also argues it is overbroad because it could apply to minors who are legally married.
The court responds that “[a]lmost every law is potentially applicable to constitutionally protected acts.” Id. at 9 (citing Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, Syl. ¶ 6 (Kan. 2000). Just because a law could possibly be applied to protected acts does not mean that it is unconstitutional. When taken as a whole, the court finds K.S.A. 21-3447(a)(2) is appropriately drafted to prevent the trafficking and exploitation of children. The State has a strong interest in protecting children and may enact legislation to protect children from trafficking. Moreover, a “common-sense interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3447(a)(2) prevents prosecution for acts like dating, flirting, driving a minor to the prom, or other similar conduct by legally married minors.” Id. at 10. Next, the court considers whether the statute is unconstitutional vague. Williams argues the statute is vague because it fails to define “used” and “sexual gratification,” and contain confusing language an ordinary person would not be able to apprehend. The court quickly dismisses the argument and finds the word used is defined clearly in the Webster Dictionary. The court further finds “sexual gratification” has been defined in Webster’s Dictionary and that the Kansas court have had no difficulty in determining that certain crimes were committed for sexual gratification. See, e.g., State v. Gallardo, 43 Kan. App. 2d 346, 352, 224 P.3d 1192 (2010). As a result, the statute is likewise not constitutionally vague. The court proceeds to dismiss Williams other arguments and affirm his conviction. The Kansas court hold the State has a justified compelling interest in protecting children against adult predators seeking to exploit them.