Last month, the Kansas Court of Appeals discussed the intent necessary to be found guilty of endangering a child. In State v. Cummings, Ms. Cummings appealed from her conviction for involuntary manslaughter. No. 102,527. Slip. op at 3 (Kan. 2010). At trial, Ms.Cummings was charged with “involuntary manslaughter based on the underlying crime of child endangerment; in other words, that she unintentionally had killed K.H. by committing the crime of endangering a child.” Id. at 4.
On appeal, Ms. Cummings argued the crime is a specific intent crime and the prosecution did not meet their burden. Moreover, she argued the jury should have been instructed on the meaning of general intent involved in endangering a child. Lastly, she challenges the jury instruction that describes the elements of endangering a child.
Ms. Cummings first claimed the prosecution should have been required to prove that she knew K.H. would suffer harm as a result of her actions. However, the Kansas Court of Appeals quickly foreclosed Ms Cummings’ argument; the court held the crime of endangering a child is not a specific intent crime. Instead, the prosecution must only prove the defendant had a general intent to commit the crime. General intent is established when there is “proof that the person acted intentionally in the sense that he [or she] was aware of what he [or she] was doing.” Id. at 5 (citing State v. Hodge, 204 Kan. 98, 108 (1969).
The court addressed Ms. Cummings’ next argument. It found the trial court did not err in denying to give the jury the following jury instruction:
“In order for the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged, the State must prove
that (his)(her) conduct was intentional. Intentional means willful and purposeful and not accidental. “Intent or lack of intent is to be determined or inferred from all of the evidence in the case.” PIK Crim. 3d 54.01-A. slip. op at 7.
The court was simple in its reasoning; because the State was not required to prove Ms. Cummings intent to harm K.H., this jury instruction was not necessary.
Lastly, the court found the trial court adequately explained the elements of endangering a child to the jury. The elements of endangering a child, as described by PIK Crim. 3d 58.10 are as follows: “That the defendant intentionally and unreasonably caused or permitted [K.H.] to be placed in a situation in which there was a reasonable probability that [K.H.'s] life, body or health would be injured or
endangered.” Slip. op at 12. The court held trial courts are not required to define the phrase “reasonable probability” in the child endangerment instruction as
meaning “something more than a faint or remote possibility” and “a likelihood.” (slip. op at 8). Instead, the court found “reasonable probability” to be a reasonable term for jurors to understand.
As a result, the court found Ms. Cumming’s arguments were without merit and affirmed her convictions. During trial, it is necessary to have an experienced lawyer who understands the difference between general and specific intent crimes. To speak with an attorney, contact Bell Folsom, P.A.